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From Independent Nation to Client State:
The Metamorphosis of the Kingdom of Hawai'i
in the Pages of the North American Review
in the Nineteenth Century
O N FEBRUARY i, 1893, United States Minister to Hawai'i John L.
Stevens wrote home to Secretary of State John W. Foster, "The
Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the
United States to pluck it."1 While Stevens may have been correct
with regard to the condition of Hawai'i after nearly ioo years of
United States involvement, the American people were not yet
prepared to harvest the fruit of this labor.
The campaign for annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the
United States in 1893 sparked a national debate over imperial
expansion and paved the way for the resurrection of "manifest
destiny" in the late 1890s. From the advent of the arrival and
settlement of American Protestant missionaries primarily from
New England in 1820, through the consolidation of United States
commercial and military superiority over other potential colonizers
and the Hawaiians themselves in the mid-19th century, the actual
process of conquest met with few obstacles. Attitudes of those
living in the U.S. towards this process, however, did not follow so
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smoothly. Public opinion lagged behind events, and the cherished
national image of fairness had to be squared with actual political
and commercial self-interest before annexation could become an
accomplished fact.
Bringing perceived reality into a consonant relationship with the
desired course of action required a complete revision of current
Hawaiian history. Advocates of annexation quoted liberally from
the Origin of Species (1859) m support of their position, and Charles
Darwin's comments on natural selection and the superiority of the
Anglo-Saxon race, especially in America, formed the basis for the
expansionist theories of political scientist John Burgess, clergyman
Josiah Strong, and others. They combined destiny, duty, religion,
commercial interests, and naval strategy with evolution to produce
what one historian has called "the imperialism of righteousness."2
These apologists for armed United States intervention to achieve
their annexationist agenda found that by placing Hawai'i and her
people on the low end of the evolutionary spectrum they were able
to achieve an acceptable solution, in the eyes of the American
public, at least, to the ethical problem presented by territorial
conquest through force.
The morality of imperialism was vigorously debated in most of
the national circulation magazines in the United States in the
19th century. With respect to Hawai'i, the change in focus and
attitude of the North American Review is typical. One of the century's
most influential magazines, the Review was founded in Boston in
1815 by William Tudor. One of a group of Boston professional
men, who were mostly Harvard-educated, he modeled his
publication on the Edinburgh Review and strove to provide a forum
for the emergence of a uniquely American mode of discourse on
art, society, and politics. Despite his stated efforts, the Review was
seen as distinctly regional in character up to 1878, employing
among its editors such eminent New Englanders as James Russell
Lowell, Charles Eliot Norton, Henry Adams, and Henry Cabot
Lodge. When the Review's base of operations shifted to New York
in 1878, the regional stigma ceased to apply.
Variously a quarterly, bi-monthly, and monthly, the Review
climbed in circulation from 600 at its outset, to 3,200 in 1830 (its
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highest point until after the Civil War), and peaked at 76,000 in
1891. While its substantial format of an average of 200 or more
pages and its reputation for regional bias may have discouraged
broader circulation, by 1820 the Review had attained a prominent
place in the libraries of Boston intellectuals and Washington policy
makers. In 1835, a competitor hailed the Review as "the sole
exponent, in its peculiar sphere, of our national mind, character,
and progress."3 At the peak of the Review's circulation in 1891, the
London-based Review of Reviews said:
It is unquestionably true that the North American is regarded by
more people, in all parts of the country, as at once the highest and
most impartial platform upon which current public issues can be
discussed, than is any other magazine or review. . . . It is to be
noted that politicians of both the great parties and members of the
legal professions are more likely to read the North American Review
than any other periodical.4
Frank Luther Mott, the foremost—albeit controversial—historian
of American magazines, singled out the North American Review as
" . . . a remarkable repository, unmatched by any other magazine
of American thought through nearly a century and a quarter of
our national life."5 The metamorphosis of Hawai'i in the pages
of this august journal may therefore provide some answers to the
question of how, in less than a century, this sovereign island nation
came to be transformed into a fruit ripe for plucking by American
hands.
Only one article on Hawai'i appeared in the Review prior to the
arrival in Hawai'i of the American missionaries in 1820. Its author
maintained: "Of these islands, so interesting to navigators, and
from their situation and production, so important to the scientific
and commercial world, a short account may be worthy of some
attention."6 But real interest did not pick up in the Boston-based
journal until people with whom its staff and readers could easily
identify took up residence in the Islands.
Between 1826 and 1842, six articles about Hawai'i of varying
lengths appeared in the magazine. Ostensibly book reviews, these
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pieces began by defending missionary labors and evolved into a
strident advocacy of the United States presence in the Islands. The
writers were literary men, not explorers, and their purpose was
philosophical rather than descriptive. Where Davis, the author of
the first article had condemned the effects of civilization on nature,
these writers favored it. Their increasingly judgmental and negative
portrayal of the native Hawaiians during this 16-year period of
missionary advocacy served to buttress arguments for intervention
—at least when it was presented as being of a moral and instructive
(that is, spiritual) nature.
Captain C. Davis, U.S. Merchant Marine, introduced the North
American Review's, readers to the Sandwich Islands in 1816. He
began his account with the geographical coordinates of the Islands,
noting their distance (2,700 miles) from the mainland United
States and their favorable location on the route from there to Asia.
He reviewed Captain James Cook's account of the "discovery" of
Hawaii in 1778 and used Cook's death at the hands of the natives
to express his own views on the effects of contact between nature
and civilization. With regard to the events leading up to the death
of the great navigator, Davis maintained:
In this, as in most other instances of fatal collision between civilized
and uncivilized men, it appears the former has been in the wrong.
The blame may, almost without exception, be laid on those, whose
might induces them to trample on right.7
Typical of European and American visitors and their biases at
that time, Davis described the Hawaiians as an artless and
comparatively uncivilized race, with a childlike fascination for the
accoutrements of progress. He explained their perceived tendency
toward petty thievery, which had so shocked his seafaring contem-
poraries, as merely the product of misunderstanding based on the
lack of a concept of private property in Hawaiian culture. He
noted with approval that when visiting him, the Hawaiians
" . . . did not go to any part of the ship without permission, and
refrained from spitting on the decks."8
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Davis's greatest praise, however, was reserved for the Hawaiian
King, Kamehameha I. Describing him as a "copper-colored
Alexander," he noted that both Kamehameha and his most
powerful rival for control of the Islands had attempted to enlist
American aid, and expressed the vain hope that "none of our
countrymen will voluntarily assist in a war of conquest."9
After recounting some additional vignettes in which Kame-
hameha I and his subjects fared much better than their "civilized"
adversaries, Davis concluded his morally nonjudgmental but still
politically interested account with a promise (unfulfilled) to send
other anecdotes of this interesting sovereign and people.10 Neither
the King nor his people would be compared so favorably to civilized
men again in the pages of the North American Review in the 19th
century.
Travelogs such as Davis's were a staple of the North American
Review up to 1825. During the remainder of the 1820s and
continuing well into the 1830s, editors such as Alexander Hill
Everett, former U.S. Minister to Spain, and John Gorham Palfrey,
Minister of Boston's Brattle Street Unitarian Church and a
Professor of Sacred Literature at Harvard, tended to emphasize
the literary review aspect of the magazine, as well as initiating a
broader focus on political affairs outside the United States. Book
reviews often took precedence over first-person narratives as
vehicles for expressing opinion. These efforts, which generally
considered several works on a single subject, were more than just
simple book reports. The authors were not identified, but their
editorial stands could not have been more boldly stated.
From the first review of books on Hawaiian topics in 1826 to
the last in 1842, the value of introducing civilization into the
Islands was not questioned. The reviewer of William Ellis's
Journal of a Tour Around the Largest of the Sandwich Islands claimed
that "it could not escape the more intelligent of the natives that
the foreigners among them were a superior race to themselves."11
He acknowledged in passing that some pre-missionary contacts
between Westerners and natives had been less than salutary but
was certain that the missionaries could reverse the damage. On
the basis of five years of reports on missionary labors, he predicted:
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The different branches of human improvement will act reciprocally
on each other, intelligence will spread and be an excitement and
guide to industry, and, in process of time, laws, morals, religion
and social order will be established and the blessings of civilized
life secured.12
The Review maintained its pro-missionary stance well into the
1840s when the United States missionary involvement in Hawaiian
politics and commerce was coming under frequent attack from
other foreign residents of the Islands, foreign governments, and
some mainland observers. While defense tactics varied in response
to the nature of the charges, the basic assumption that the
missionary presence was justified remained the same. What did
change was the prognosis regarding the effects of this presence on
Native Hawaiians and their nation.
Responding in 1828 to what he perceived as implications by
the Right Honorable (George Anson) Lord Byron in his Voyage of
His Majesty's Ship Blonde to the Sandwich Islands, in the Tears 1824-5
that the Islands would be better off under British control, the
North American's reviewer said:
Whether it would be wise, or unwise, for the British or the American
cabinet to desire colonies in the Pacific we leave for others to
decide. There is no doubt, however, that things are now tending
toward the occupation of these Islands by a foreign power.13
He no longer regarded independence as a viable option, nor did
he believe that the Hawaiians could rise to the level of their
missionary tutors.
As missionary involvement in Island politics increased, so did
the need to defend this involvement from its non-missionary critics.
The Hawaiians' alleged need for salvation was painted in increas-
ingly desperate colors. Once merely innocent children of nature,
they became licentious cannibals "sunk in darkest ignorance."14
Criticism of the missionaries was dismissed as being motivated by
the desire of some entrepeneurs to take unfair advantage of the
natives. Such criticism, therefore, did a great injustice to a group
of men "who have rendered one of the most signal services to the
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cause of Christianity and civilization since the Reformation."15
Exactly how these servants of civilization had benefitted the
Hawaiians was not clear.
The reviewer of Reverend Samuel Northrup Castle's An Account
of the Visit of the French Frigate Artemise to the Sandwich Islands, July,
1839, did not deny the French government's charge that Protestant
missionaries had influenced the Hawaiian King, Kamehameha
III, to ban Roman Catholicism from the Islands. It suited his
argument in this instance to characterize the monarchy as "the
legitimate government of an independent state," but he was not
bothered by a United States protectorate over this "independent
state."16
By the time that Cleveland's A Narrative of Voyages and Commercial
Enterprises came under scrutiny in 1842, the writer for the North
American Review no longer attempted in any way to excuse the
non-religious aspects of missionary labors. He noted that while
commercial interests in the past had been the enemy of Christianity,
"Christianity was no enemy of commerce."17
The commercial involvement of United States interests in
Hawai'i increased during the years between 1842 and 1893. The
Great Mahele or divison of lands in 1848 enabled settlers to buy
land and create large sugar plantations. In 1872, the Kamehameha
dynasty, which had ruled the Islands since 1796, came to an end.
William Charles Lunalilo was elected to the throne, and during
his brief tenure American influence in Hawai'i was secure.
However, with his death in 1874 and the election of David Kalakaua
to succeed him, that situation began to change.
King Kalakaua made numerous diplomatic overtures to the
United States, including the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 which
encouraged trade between the two sovereign nations and opened
the way for large-scale American investments in Hawaiian
agriculture. This treaty was renegotiated in 1887 to include the
American acquisition of a naval base at Pearl Harbor and to bind
U.S. mercantile interest even closer to those of her Hawaiian-born
sons and daughters. However, on the domestic front, the admini-
stration of Kalakaua was very threatening to his non-native
subjects. He dismissed cabinets at will and generally acted with a
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degree of independence which caused members of the rising haole
(Caucasian) oligarchy to fear for their continued fiscal security.
The Review was silent on these matters, preferring to concentrate
on events closer to home—primarily the Civil War and problems
of urbanization and industry. The magazine itself experienced
some hard times during these years. Publication had been at
first bi-monthly, then quarterly, and again bi-monthly. Owners
and editors came and went at a rapid rate, and the magazine
finally moved to New York in 1878, at which time it became
primarily a monthly and a political rather than literary journal.
Mainland commercial interest in Hawai'i as a market increased
following the end of post-Civil war reconstruction. The annexation
question provided a suitable topic for the Review's new format, and
in 1893 representatives of both sides began to present their views
in its pages. While ethics was still a concern, the debate no longer
centered on the missionaries. The primary mode of discourse was
geopolitical and commercial.
Many previously isolationist Americans began to look with
favor on involvement in the Pacific as the need for new markets
for the products of industry became acute. Hawaiian citizens of
North American extraction and United States citizens residing in
Hawai'i had been seeking stronger ties to their homeland for a
long time. Now such ties began to seem mutually advantageous as
Americans were forced into competition with Great Britain and
Germany for trade routes to the Orient.
Lorrin A. Thurston, former Minister of the Interior for the
Kingdom of Hawai'i and founding member of the Annexation
Club in 1892, which became synonymous with the Provisional
Government following the revolution of 1893, had gone to
Washington in 1892, ostensibly in connection with Hawai'i's
participation in the Chicago World's Fair. In reality, he was there
to gauge U.S. congressional sentiment regarding annexation. He
found the press and the Secretary of State to be sympathetic.
Minister Stevens, meanwhile, was inquiring of his superiors in
Washington as to " . . . how far in the present matter the naval
commander may deivate from established international conven-
tions should a coup be attempted."18
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The Hawaiian Monarchy was overthrown on January 17, 1893,
in Honolulu by a group of Caucasian businessmen and sugar
planters, most of whom had either commercial or personal ties to
the United States, or both. As promised to them by Minister
Stevens, troops from the U.S.S. Boston came to their aid. The troops
stationed themselves near the Government Building, where they
so intimidated the Queen's forces that on January 17, when the
annexationists seized the palace and proclaimed themselves as the
"Provisional Government," the Hawaiians did not resist. Thurston
and his supporters now faced the more difficult task of convincing
the United States to take them in.
Richard Hofstadter, in his treatise on Social Darwinism, wrote
that annexation in the 1890s was not initially a popular cause.
After analyzing the works of such contemporary disciples of
Darwin as Josiah Strong, John W. Burgess, and naval strategist
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, he concluded:
At the time of imperialist friction there was nothing to stop the
advocates of expansion and the propagandists of militarism from
[employing] the shibboleths of group survival or from transforming
them into a doctrine of group assertiveness and racial destiny to
justify the ways of international competition. The survival of the
fittest had once been used chiefly to support business competition
at home; now it was used to support expansion abroad.19
This reasoning proved to be very efficient at bridging the gap
between moral and religious beliefs and commercial and strategic
interests. Examples of it abound in the North American Review
throughout the 1890s.
Thurston himself presented the opening argument for annexa-
tion in the pages of the Review. Beginning with a capsule history
of diplomatic relations between the United States and Hawai'i, he
noted in passing the missionary involvement that had been central
to earlier discussions of the Islands but dismissed it as no longer
significant. He told his story in the same glowing terms used to
defend the missionaries, but for him it was:
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American capital and enterprise [that] pioneered an advance into
Hawaii, built up a friendly political state, and created not only
the best customer, for its population, that the United States has,
but produced one of the most remarkable exhibitions of creative
industrial energy in history.20
Thurston informed his readers that immigrants from the United
States and their descendants now owned two-thirds of the culti-
vated land in Hawai'i and controlled 74 percent of the sugar
export business. Along with imports to Hawai'i from the mainland,
this had resulted in some $60 million of profits to American
business in the years since the first Reciprocity Treaty. Thurston
argued from this that American vested interest in the Islands was
justified in overriding Hawaiian political rights to independence.
He claimed that the natives had been unable to sustain the
independent state which American residents had helped them to
create. Since the domination of Hawai'i by any other foreign
power was as unacceptable to his American readers as it was to
him, the choice seemed clear. "The manifest destiny of all relations
heretofore existing between the United States and Hawaii has
been towards ultimate political union,"21 according to Thurston,
and the sooner it happened the better—for both parties. The rights
and desires of the native Hawaiians were no longer relevant to the
participants at this level of negotiations.
In the debate format characteristic of the Review at this time,
Thurston's article was paired with a discussion of the constitutional
objections to annexation by George Ticknor Curtis. This aged and
eminent constitutional scholar argued that the acquisition of an
independent state by force would reflect badly on the reputation
of the more powerful partner. He predicted accurately that an
investigation into the Hawaiian revolution would find that
". . . it was fomented by interested foreigners and that the leaders
of the revolution received improper assistance from the United
States authorities."22 He countered Thurston's pragmatism with
an appeal to national morality and cautioned that the acquisition
of Hawai'i in such an unethical manner would substitute manifest
destiny for the Constitution and lead to a system of mercantile
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colonies on the Roman model. This ethical argument, and others
like it, would be successful until manifest destiny could be reformu-
lated in terms consonant with the morality of the time. But even
Curtis did not rule out the possible acquisition of Hawai'i at some
future date by other means. Nor did he discuss whether or not the
wishes of the native Hawaiians should be taken into account.
Even Theo. H. Davies, an English subject and the guardian of
Hawaiian heir-apparent Princess Ka'iulani, did not deny the
possibility of a more ethical move toward annexation. Responding
to Thurston in the June 1893 issue of the Review, he accurately
summarized the former's position with regard to the paramount
commercial interests of Americans in Hawai'i. He made a doomed
plea for restoration of the Monarchy with British-educated
Ka'iulani as a ruler more acceptable by Western standards than
the deposed Queen Liliu'okalani. He expressed the belief that if
the true facts of the revolution became known to the American
people they would reject annexation. In this he was correct for a
time, but the anti-monarchy, anti-British sentiments dominant in
America precluded his hopes for Ka'iulani.
The Princess herself seems to have been resigned to failure, as
indicated by the rather plaintive reasoning she gave for her presence
in Washington: "Perhaps if I do not go, the Hawaiians will say
to me hereafter, 'You might have saved us and you did not try.' "23
Discussions of the morality of imperialism tended more and more
frequently to end on a similar note of resignation in the face of
inevitable circumstances throughout the interim period of the
Hawaiian Republic (1894-1900).
In December, the Review again served as a forum for opposing
viewpoints regarding the Hawaiian question. Eugene Tyler
Chamberlain titled his piece "The Hawaiian Situation—I. The
Invasion of Hawaii" and argued that United States involvement
in the coup had damaged his country's reputation for fairness
among nations. Recently appointed U.S. Commander of Naviga-
tion, he considered the nature of his country's military involvement
to be of paramount importance. He cited Daniel Webster's
affirmation of Hawaiian independence in 1851, and he stressed the
injustice of a strong nation overruling the desires of a weaker one
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by force.24 Chamberlain had no quarrel with Thurston about the
benefits to the United States of annexing Hawai'i. The question
for him was one of procedure, not outcome.
The aforementioned Minister Stevens responded to Chamberlain
with "The Hawaiian Situation—II. A Plea for Annexation,"
based on his premise that the Kamehameha dynasty (with whom
Daniel Webster had dealt) was now extinct, and no native
successor Stevens considered worthy had appeared to lead the
Hawaiian nation. The popularity and effectiveness of Kalakaua
and Liliu'okalani among their own people were conveniently
ignored. Stevens saw the question facing the United States not as
one of national reputation, but of duty to civilization and to its
own citizens and their descendents in the Islands. He maintained
that intervention was justified ". . . in the name of what is
most sacred in Christian civilization, in behalf of a noble
American colony, holding the advanced post of America's
progress."25
Where Thurston appealed primarily to commercial interests,
Stevens shifted the argument toward the logic of irresistible
circumstances and benevolent paternalism. He said that while the
surviving natives
. . . should be most kindly dealt with, allowed every possible
opportunity to improve themselves, it would be throwing to the
winds all past experience and historical instruction to think longer
of governing the islands by the native races which comprises about
one-third of the population.26
Not only was America responsible for her own citizens in the
Islands and for her future interests as a naval power, but she also
had a duty to those she perceived as her weaker brothers and sisters
who could not survive alone.
Stevens also raised the question of Asian residents in Hawai'i.
Along with his previous reference to the diminishing number of
native Hawaiians, this demographic issue would become a matter
of increasing importance in later arguments both for and against
annexation. Stevens used it to press for swift legislative action in
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order to prevent the territory from being "submerged and overrun
by Asiatics."27 Impressed neither by this sense of urgency nor the
righteousness of the annexation cause, Congress rejected the
appeals of Thurston and Stevens and refused to annex Hawai'i
in 1893.
With "Our Present Duty" by William McKendree Springer in
1893, the argument took a decidedly isolationist and still more
racist turn. Springer, a Democrat from Illinois and a Representa-
tive to the U.S. Congress for 20 years (1875-1895), had drafted
legislation admitting Washington, Montana, and Oklahoma into
the Union as states, and he accepted the assessment of Thurston
and Stevens that Hawai'i at the time of the revolution was a feeble
nation that could not govern itself effectively. He did not believe,
however, that the United States had any right to interfere on that
basis, or to offer support for the current Provisional Government
simply because it was Christian and composed of former American
citizens. He noted with dismay in the final article in this series,
"The Hawaiian Situation—III. Our Present Duty," that to use
this line of reasoning " . . . would make the United States the
moral and religious arbiter of the world."
Unlike his predecessors who condemned armed intervention by
U.S. troops in the Hawaiian conflict but did not deny that
annexation itself was desirable, Springer opposed annexation by
any means. He was especially concerned with the fact that
annexation would result in Native Hawaiians and Asian residents
of the Islands becoming citizens of the United States, eligible for
unrestrained migration to our shores and to representation in
Congress. He saw the "present duty"28 of his country as preserving
the integrity of its Anglo-Saxon institutions from the diluting
influence of such supposedly impure and inferior races.
In the Review's "Notes and Comments" section, readers of the
magazine expressed parallel concerns and employed similar
arguments to those of the writers mentioned above. Lieutenant
John A. Harmon, U.S. Army, stressed the military, naval, and
commercial advantages of annexation. According to him, the
diplomatic process would merely acknowledge what had already
occurred de facto: "Hawaii is an American State and is embraced
222 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
in the American commercial and military system."29 He took it
upon himself to speak for the Hawaiians, claiming that they
preferred United States protection to that of any other nation, and
dismissed the argument regarding the native population's unfitness
for citizenship by stating that the Hawaiians were a superior race
to American Negroes and in any case were dying off at a rapid rate.
Recently returned from Hawai'i, wealthy New York industrialist
and railroad magnate Arthur Curtiss James credited his pro-
annexation stand to first-person experience and enlightened
observation. He used the rapidly declining native population to
argue against a return to the Monarchy. He seconded Harmon's
observation on the Americanization of the Islands and used this
to support the assertion that Hawai'i was a unique situation that
would not lead to the unrestrained imperialism feared by Cham-
berlain and Springer. He agreed with Thurston, Stevens, and the
early defenders of the missionaries that, "It is natural that the
white man should become the governing power."30
Whether this domination should take the form of annexation,
however, was still an open question. In the "Notes and Comments"
for September 1897, another concerned reader recalled Springer's
warning about unrestricted immigration in even more alarmist
terms. Writing that ". . . the detested and dangerous Asiatic must
reach the American ballot box if Hawaiian annexation is to
become an established fact,"31 he inquired if President William
McKinley and the Republican Party were ready for such an
awesome responsibility. The answer was yes, but it would take the
Siege of Manila in 1898 to sway the balance of public opinion in
favor of legislating annexation.
Meanwhile, considering the Darwin-inspired popularity of a
scientific approach to the subject of race at the end of the 19th
century, it is not surprising that the North American Review should
contain the advice and comments of medical men with regard to
the question of annexation. Dr. Prince A. Morrow, an eminent
New York dermatologist and social reformer, noted that the
proposed legislation had excited general interest among the citizens
of the United States (it was a topic of general news in the popular
press) and that the strategic and commercial aspects of the
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situation had been set forth elsewhere. He then proceeded to
address himself to a discussion of the rapid death rate among the
natives since the white man's arrival on their shores. He praised
the pre-contact Polynesians and echoed sentiments expressed by
Captain Davis back in 1816 that contact with civilization could
be lethal-—especially with the diseases of civilization.
Race per se was not the focus of Dr. Morrow's argument against
annexation. Rather, it was the convenient presence of leprosy in
the Islands, which he had observed in person and included in his
1889 pamphlet on leprosy. Just prior to the new vote on annexa-
ion, in late 1897, he was concerned with ". . . the Serious question
of which will be the effect of the absorption of this tainted population
on the health interests of this country."32 While firmly attributing
the presence of the disease to foreign influences—most likely the
introduction of Chinese laborers to the sugar plantation in the late
1840s (those "dangerous Asiatics" again)—this otherwise enligh-
tened social reformer viewed its subsequent prevalence among
Native Hawaiians as proof of their genetic inferiority.
Morrow presented a gruesome scientific description of the
physical manifestations and progress of the disease and chronicled
the history of Hawaii's attempts to combat it. He judged that the
number of lepers would continue to increase, despite a stringent
disease management program, and noted that in recent years
some white immigrants to the Hawaiian Islands had been infected.
Even more alarming to him, however, than the possible dangers
inherent in contact with this tainted population by entrepreneurial
immigrants who chose to risk it, was the hidden danger from legal
emigration of Hawaiians to the United States mainland in the
event of annexation. Since in its early stages leprosy defied
detection, it would be impossible to exclude carriers of the dread
disease from American shores by quarantine. While noting that
the disease was more likely to take root in a suitable, i.e., tropical,
soil, Morrow still concluded that:
Experience shows that in all countries where leprosy has become
epidemic its advance is insidious; it spreads slowly, and before
health authorities awaken to the realization of the danger it has
made such headway that its future progress cannot be arrested.33
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Dr. Morrow reformulated his predecessors' overtly racist and
emotional objections to Hawaiian annexation in the language of
so-called scientific objectivity, with the consequences to be consi-
dered from a public health point of view. The "detested and
dangerous Asiatics" in this new version became part of a leprous
population whose medically diagnosed inferior status precluded
further discussion.
By 1898, the combined mercantile interests of Hawai'i and the
mainland had won out over the isolationists. Hawai'i was annexed,
and while the facts regarding leprosy, of course, had not changed,
the situation was now presented to the American public in a much
less alarming manner. In the September 1898 issue of the North
American Review, Dr. Burnside Foster, another eminent dermatolo-
gist, educated at Harvard and practicing in St. Paul, Minnesota,
looked at the history and clinical profile of leprosy in Hawai'i. A
champion of medical ethics, frequent office holder in both state
and national American Medical Associations, and long-time editor
of the St. Paul Medical Journal, he took a prescriptive approach,
rather than the cautionary one espoused by Morrow. "Shouldering
the white man's burden" in a geopolitical and characteristically
messianic context, he stated that:
The responsibility of this matter of leprosy has now been assumed
by the United States, and as we already have undertaken to free
Cuba from the curse of Spanish rule, so must we undertake the far
more difficult task of freeing Hawaii from the curse of leprosy.34
In line with his role as a dedicated medical politician, he then took
advantage of the situation to propose a bureaucratic approach
beneficial to his own profession—the establishment of a depart-
ment of public health, with a minister in the President's Cabinet.
The cautionary note remained, however, even in this much
more clinical and proprietary treatment. Relying on the advance-
ment of scientific knowledge—specifically, better methods of
detection in leprosy's early stages—Foster closed with an appeal
to the glory of America's civilizing mission. "Shall not America,"
he asked, "which has already given the world the priceless blessing
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of anaesthesia, gain further glory by striking leprosy from the
calendar of human afflictions?"35
The idea of its own destiny as a nation dominated American
attitudes toward territorial expansion in the 19th century. The
advocates of Hawaiian annexation could not use simple geogra-
phical determinism to support this notion of destiny where their
cause was concerned, so they found other justifications. The
proclaimed superiority of democratic institutions, the unique
suitability of the white race to rule over others, and survival of the
fittest all gained acceptance in the pages of the North American
Review and in other magazines and journals, too.
In restrospect, the North American Review's pattern of coverage
of Hawai'i in the 19th century is an example of how an elite,
supposedly enlightened journal reflected the version of events that
most suited the practical requirements of its influential constituents.
From its presentation of the Sandwich Islands as a unique, exotic,
and independent kingdom inhabited by uncivilized but tractable
children of nature in 1816, to that of a nation of feckless heathens
who needed outside intervention in order to save both their souls
and their kingdom during the 1840s, the Review revised its position
in the 1890s to accommodate the exigencies of the national
political agenda.
After a debate on the merits and procedural aspects of annexation
in 1893, the Review turned again to advocacy. In the late 1890s,
writers for the magazine disenfranchised the native Hawaiians
completely by portraying them as dangerously diseased and
genetically doomed. Then they reduced the element of danger.
Hawai'i was transformed after annexation into a Territory that
readers of the North American Review would come to feel both
comfortable with and justified about placing alongside Cuba and
the Philippines as just another item on the United States' ever-
lengthening agenda of national responsibilities.
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